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Introduction 
The Single Market (SM) constitutes the world’s largest economic area. Its trade liberalization policies can bring 
about significant income gains: Fewer barriers to trade are likely to increase competition and boost the productiv-
ity of firms – which would positively impact upon wage growth. Moreover, heightened competition decreases 
markups and reduces the prices of goods and services, which fosters consumer welfare. Through these chan-
nels, the SM increases the size of the “economic pie” and contributes to stronger economic growth across 
European countries and regions. These welfare gains can be deemed as “direct” or “first round” as fewer trade 
barriers and thus lower trade costs due to the SM directly translate into higher productivity and lower prices. Em-
pirically, these welfare gains have been documented in a number of recent studies (e.g., Ponattu and Mion, 
2019a). 
In theory, however, the SM would also, albeit indirectly, affect another quantity that fosters economic growth, but 
is often neglected when studying gains from EU integration: population size. The growth accounting technique in 
economics separates economic growth into the three components of capital, productivity and labor – where the 
latter would be positively affected by population growth. Thus, the income gains from the SM make the set of par-
ticipating countries more attractive as a place to live as compared to countries outside the SM. Therefore, more 
people from the rest of the world would choose to live and work in Europe and its population grows. Population 
growth, in turn, adds to economic growth and can thus exhibit an indirect or “second round” effect on economic 
growth. It is thus important to understand not just how the SM affects welfare through lifting barriers to trade, but 
also how the SM affects population sizes across Europe – especially as ageing in most European is projected to 
reduce the labor force and thus hamper growth. 
To what extent are income gains from the SM and population flows from outside the SM related? If they are, in 
which countries and regions does the SM matter the most for population growth? We address these questions by 
running a thought experiment. Specifically, we simulate the abolishment of the SM to analyze how a decline in 
welfare gains would impact upon population sizes across Europe. As in Mion and Ponattu (2019a), we use a 
modern quantitative trade model of the global economy based on Behrens et al. (2014) and Behrens et al. (2017) 
and data on world trade flows (from COMTRADE (ITS)) to analyze the effects of undoing the SM. We firstly esti-
mate the impact of undoing the SM at the country level with our baseline being the year 2016. We secondly use 
the Eurostat Regio database to break down the individual country effects to the NUTS2 level. It is important to 
note that our approach reflects the population outflows from the SM area into the rest of the world as a result of 
terminating the SM. Thus, our results do not reflect intra-European population flows as a result of undoing the 
SM.    
The simulated population changes reflect a location choice solely based on changes in welfare if people were 
completely free to move. But even if parts of the labor force intended to move locations, there would be legal and 
other hurdles ultimately preventing some of the leavers from doing so. Thus, our estimates should be seen as an 
upper bound or benchmark of population changes that countries and regions could expect as a result of undoing 
the SM. Despite this caveat, the relative differences in the simulated losses allow us to compare countries and 
regions. We find that welfare losses due to a hypothetical removal of the SM and the associated welfare losses 
would indeed trigger people to leave the SM area: All SM members would see a shrinking population as a result 
of undoing the SM, simply because the terms of trade for SM members would worsen as compared to the rest of 
the world. The magnitude of population losses, however, varies strongly across countries and regions: Those at 
the core (strong beneficiaries of the SM) would see the highest losses, whereas countries and regions in the pe-
riphery would see little of its population leave. Overall, the results suggest that the impact of the SM on population 
sizes is important, especially as ageing has become a challenge in many advanced European economies. In 
terms of policy, the analysis speaks in favor of completing the SM as it does not only affect economic growth 
through lower trade costs, but can also attract labor, which is conducive to economic growth. 
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The big picture: Looking at countries around the world 
Starting with the country level, the analysis suggests that all EU countries (and other members of the SM) would 
incur population reductions if the trade boosting effect of the EU single market vanished. This result is obvious 
since trade restrictions would affect SM countries only vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This way, the former SM 
members trade less with each other. The population decline SM members is significant: On average, a country’s 
population would see a (maximum) reduction of about 1% in population size if the SM were to be abolished. Con-
versely, the rest of the world would see increases in population sizes due to the non-existence of the SM. This is 
because in a counterfactual world without the SM, trade costs increase for SM members, which makes, in relative 
terms, the rest of the world more attractive to trade with. In other words, the terms of trade improves for the rest of 
the world, leading to welfare gains for these countries – such gains, in turn, attract people to move to countries 
and regions not members of the SM. Table 1 summarizes the population gains at the country level. The countries 
with the highest maximum number of simulated population gains would be the US and Israel (at about 0.6%) and 
Australia (0.5%). 
Across the countries within the SM, the estimated population decline varies considerably across countries. Small 
and particularly open countries like Luxembourg, Norway, Switzerland and the Netherlands with excellent market 
access would incur maximum population losses of up to 3% of its population. At the same time, population reduc-
tions for countries in the periphery (e.g., Bulgaria and Romania) would be much smaller at about 0.2%. Overall, 
these maximum losses in population size reflect the distribution of welfare gains that are due to the SM and its 
differential impact across EU countries and regions. The aforementioned set of small, open economies are also 
the ones featuring the strongest per-capita economic gains from the SM.  
Figure 1 plots the relationship between the projected reduction in population size and the loss of welfare associ-
ated with the removal of the SM. As can be seen, the relationship is positive: The higher the welfare losses are, 
the higher the decline in population size. Countries outside of the SM see positive changes in welfare and popula-
tion, whereas naturally all SM members see reductions in both quantities. Figure 1 allows for some interesting 
observations: For instance, Luxembourg would see the same population decline as Switzerland, but at a lower 
welfare loss. This difference could suggest that compared to Luxembourg, the Swiss economy is slightly less de-
pendent on (skilled) labor from abroad or less labor intensive in general. Indeed, the share of services of GDP is 
lower in Switzerland than in Luxembourg. Less surprisingly, Switzerland and the Czech Republic exhibit the same 
projected welfare loss. However, Switzerland would experience four times the decline in labor, which reflects its 
higher share of foreign (skilled and mobile) labor in Switzerland as opposed to the Czech Republic. Note that the 
welfare loss in the Czech Republic could be a result of the country being fairly well integrated in pan-European 
value chains, for instance in manufacturing. 
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Zooming in: What about regions within countries? 
We find that regional differences in population decline are also severe. In line with the country results, a separate 
regression analysis reveals that population reductions are higher for (1) regions experiencing higher welfare 
gains, (2) regions that are larger and (3) regions that have less favorable amenities in terms of weather and cli-
mate (especially Northern Europe). Overall these three covariates explain 90% of the variation in the data. Doing 
away with the SM would see the region of Zurich lose out the most in terms of population size with a maximum 
reduction of about 4%. The simulation also suggests that other Swiss regions incur maximum losses of similar 
magnitude (around 3-4%). Other regions like the Austrian region of Voralberg and Brussels record strong gains, 
too (at about 2.6%). On the contrary, regions in southeast Europe come last, e.g. the Bulgarian region of Severen 
Tsentralen sees a maximum loss of just about 0.17%. Within-country heterogeneity is high, too: For example, the 
Italian region of Bozen would feature a strong, above-average maximum loss in population of 1.5% if the SM 
ceased to exist – while Sicily in the Mezzogiorno would only see less than 0.5% of losses. Any such disparities 
are also observable in economically stronger countries: In Germany, maximum losses could be as high as 1.6% 
in the Oberbayern region (which includes the Munich area) and just half the loss in the east German region of 
Brandenburg.  
Figure 2 maps the heterogeneity in terms of projected population losses across NUTS2 regions. It also reveals 
other patterns across countries: Overall, population losses resemble a core-periphery pattern with strong maxi-
mum losses concentrated on rather wealthy countries in the core of Europe; southern, eastern and western 
regions in the periphery would lose smaller shares of its population. Within countries, there is a strong east-west 
difference in maximum losses within France – mostly stemming from the east being closer to larger markets like 
Germany and Italy as well as to particularly open economies like Switzerland, Luxembourg and Belgium. In 
Spain, projected losses in population size would be higher in wealthier regions like Catalunya and the Basque 
Country, but much smaller in the south of the country. Italy displays a strong difference between the north and the 
south (Mezzogiorno) with population losses being much higher in the former region. 
 
The role of Brexit 
The UK’s exit from the EU (Brexit) is likely to significantly weaken the UK’s embeddedness in the SM framework, 
especially in a hard Brexit scenario. Thus, the welfare losses associated with Brexit will also affect population 
The Single Market, welfare and population size | Page 7 
 
sizes across Europe. Again considering countries from all over the world (not just Europe), it is clear to see that 
Brexit weakens the terms of trade for all of SM member countries. In Mion and Ponattu (2019b), we study the im-
pact of a hard and soft Brexit scenario using a gravity model of trade. Here, we apply the model with the same 
parameters to gauge the effect on population losses.1  
Figure 3 depicts maximum population losses associated with a hard Brexit scenario, as simulated in Mion and 
Ponattu (2019b). Clearly, the magnitude of the impact would be significantly lower than in the case of abolishment 
of the entire SM. Yet, some countries and regions would lose significant population shares. First and foremost the 
UK would see significant maximum losses of about 1.1% of its population – which is, for the UK, even higher than 
in the scenario in which the whole SM would be removed. In the hard Brexit scenario, Ireland would see a maxi-
mum population loss of about 0.9%, corresponding to about half the loss as compared to the scenario undoing 
the SM. For other SM member countries, the impact is much lower, ranging between 0.01% in Bulgaria and Ro-
mania and 0.2% in the Netherlands. This arguably wide range indicates that countries and regions with a more 
dense trade relations with the UK are to lose the highest population shares, with welfare gains from trade being 
the driver of these losses.  
  
Conclusion: What can policymakers do? 
Much of the current debate on the EU Single Market (SM) centers around the direct economic value of the SM. It 
mostly focuses on productivity, competition and ultimately welfare effects. In this policy brief, we discuss to what 
extent these welfare effects may also impact population size. Specifically, we employ a gravity model of trade to 
simulate the effect of welfare changes on population sizes across Europe assuming that the SM agreement would 
suddenly cease to exist. These hypothetical changes in population size can be interpreted as a result of citizens’ 
shifts in location choice based on welfare changes resulting from abolishing the SM and thus increased trade 
costs vis-à-vis countries not part of the SM. It should be noted that the simulated population change resembles a 
                                                     
1 See Mion and Ponattu (2019a) for details on the estimation technique and the associated calibration of the 
model. 
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hypothetical choice solely based on changes in welfare.2 Even if people sought to move locations accordingly, 
there would be legal and other hurdles impeding them from doing so. Therefore, the estimates reported here 
should be seen as an upper bound of population declines that a country or region could see as a result of the SM 
ceasing to exist. However, the relative differences in the losses allow us to compare the differential impact across 
countries and regions. 
Overall, a removal of the SM agreement would clearly weaken trade integration across Europe vis-à-vis the rest 
of world. Welfare and population declines are linked: The simulation suggests that all countries and regions cur-
rently in the SM would lose part of its population if trade liberalization policies of the SM were to be removed. The 
magnitude of losses differs quite strongly: Regions that economically benefit the most from the SM (e.g., Switzer-
land, Austria, Ireland, Norway and Germany) would see a significant reduction in population size. On the contrary, 
regions in the European periphery (e.g., in the south east) would see very little change in population if the SM 
were to be removed. Differences within countries are also noteworthy: Germany would see a strong east-west 
divide, as would France. Regional disparities within Italy and the UK would largely resemble a north-south divide. 
The simulations highlight several relevant implications for policy. First, in line with growth accounting, population 
size and the labor force are one of the factors driving growth. Thus, the analysis suggests that the SM does not 
only realize more gains from trade, but could also contribute to medium-run growth as it attracts labor from the 
rest of the world as compared to the counterfactual of no SM. This potential “second round” effect of the SM ap-
pears to be even more critical in light of the ageing workforce in many SM member countries. Moreover, skilled 
labor is meant to be more mobile (Arpaia et al., 2014), suggesting that especially skilled labor would be inclined to 
leave if the SM agreement was to be terminated. Such considerations could be particularly important for mem-
bers of the SM like Norway or Switzerland, with the latter currently re-negotiating their SM membership with the 
EU. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the completion of the SM should be a priority for EU policy makers as 
it can realize additional gains from the SM, both more first order ones (gains from trade) and second round gains 
(population growth). Hence, the current strategies on the digital SM and the capital markets union should be im-
plemented swiftly. The deepening of the SM would realize more gains in productivity and eventually welfare, 
which would – in turn – attract even more labor leading to a stronger second round growth effect.  
Third, and related to the deepening of the SM, is a stronger emphasis on a common innovation policy and indus-
trial policy across Europe. These initiatives can help the SM to even better capitalize on its harmonized rules, 
e.g., through a state-of-the-art infrastructure. Again, welfare gains from the SM would increase even more, con-
tributing to both first and second round gains through population growth. It should be noted, however, that an 
improvement in infrastructure does not necessarily or unambiguously help laggard regions catch up – in fact, im-
proving infrastructure between the core and the periphery could even increase agglomeration in the core 
(Krugman and Venables, 1990). Nonetheless, such measures could help laggard regions to more strongly benefit 
from the SM, which is a pull factor for population size and which would help narrow the gap to the economically 
strongest regions.  
                                                     
2 Even though the model allows for location preferences independent of welfare gains, too. See the technical ap-
pendix of Mion and Ponattu (2019a) for details. 
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